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Abstract
If a finite two person game form has the property that every 2-by-2 fragment is Nash
consistent, then no derivative game admits an individual improvement cycle.
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Shapley (1964) showed that if every 2£2 submatrix of a payo® matrix possesses a saddle
point, then the whole matrix also possesses a saddle point. Such matrices were studied
by Gurvich and Libkin (1990). The result does not extend even to bimatrix games.
The purpose of this note is to show that a strengthened version of Shapley's theorem
holds for bimatrix game forms: If a ¯nite two person game form has the property that
every 2 £ 2 fragment is Nash consistent, then no derivative game admits an individual
improvement cycle (hence the whole game form is Nash consistent as well).
The notions of individual improvement paths and cycles are taken from Monderer
and Shapley (1996). If a ¯nite strategic game admits no improvement cycle, then every
fragment possesses a Nash equilibrium. The converse does not hold even for two person
games (Takahashi and Yamamori, 2002). For two person game forms, however, it happens
to hold; whether it is valid for more than two players remains an open question.
Nash consistency of a game form satisfying our condition can be derived from the
existing literature (Vladimir Gurvich, personal communication): If the players are given
arbitrary antagonistic preferences, then the derivative game possesses a saddle point by
Shapley (1964); by Moulin (1976), the game form must be tight; by Gurvich (1988),
it is Nash consistent. However, the absence of improvement cycles is a much stronger
requirement. Several examples of such game forms are given in Kukushkin (2002). Theo-
rem 1 from that paper describes a class of games with perfect information satisfying the
requirement; the class contains Rosenthal's (1981, Example 3) centipede game (the last
observation is due to Dave Furth).
Milchtaich (1996) introduced a more restrictive notion of a best response improvement
path (cycle). Kukushkin (2004) obtained natural su±cient conditions for the absence of
such cycles in a strategic game; the conditions do not ensure the absence of any im-
provement cycle. Corollary 2 below shows that, as long as two-person game forms are
considered, there is no di®erence between the two kinds of acyclicity.
Section 2 contains the basic de¯nitions and the formulation of the main result; its
proof is in Section 3. Possible extensions and open questions are presented in Section 4.
2 Formulation
A ¯nite game form G is de¯ned by a ¯nite set of players N, a ¯nite strategy set Xi for each
i 2 N, a ¯nite set of outcomes A and a mapping g: XN ! A, where XN =
Q
i2N Xi is the
set of strategy pro¯les. Once preferences of the players over the outcomes are speci¯ed,
and we always assume this to be done with a list ÀN of ordinal utilities Ài: A ! R, i 2 N,
a derivative game G(ÀN) emerges, in which the set of players is N, the strategy sets are
1Xi's and utilities are ui(xN) = Ài(g(xN)).
A strategic path is a ¯nite or in¯nite sequence fxk








N such that x0
N = xM
N and M > 0. A strategic cycle is an improvement
cycle in a derivative game G(ÀN) if ui(x
k+1




N di®er in xi.
If, additionally, x
k+1
i is a best response to xk
¡i, we have a best response improvement cycle.
A game form G is acyclic if no derivative game G(ÀN) admits an improvement cycle.
A game form G is Nash consistent if every derivative game G(ÀN) possesses a Nash equi-
librium. Since we only consider ¯nite games, every acyclic game form is Nash consistent.
When considering two person game forms, we assume N = f1;2g. Moreover, we
usually view player 1 as the representative player.
Lemma 1. A two person game form with X1 = fx0
1;x00
1g and X2 = fx0
2;x00
2g is Nash









Proof. The su±ciency immediately follows from Gurvich (1988); the necessity, from
Moulin (1976). Both are easy to check by themselves. Note that every Nash consistent
2 £ 2 game form is acyclic.
A fragment G0 of G is a game form with the same set of players N and nonempty
subsets ; 6= X0
i µ Xi for all i 2 N. If G is acyclic, then so is every fragment of G; Nash
consistency need not be \inherited" in this sense.
Remark. Shapley (1964) employed the term \subgame," but since then it has become
widely used in the literature on extensive games with a di®erent meaning.
Theorem 1. A ¯nite two person game form G is acyclic if and only if every 2£2 fragment
of G is Nash consistent.
The necessity is straightforward; the su±ciency proof is deferred to the next section.
3 Proof





N which becomes an improvement cycle in a derivative game G(ÀN).
Without restricting generality, we may assume that there is no shorter improvement cycle
in any derivative game, hence the improvements of both players alternate along the cycle,
hence M = 2m. Since every 2 £ 2 fragment is Nash consistent, m > 2.





all k and both i. We denote K = f0;:::;m ¡ 1g, ¥i = fx
2k+i
N gk2K for each i 2 N, and
¥ = ¥1 [ ¥2.
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is a shorter improvement cycle in G(ÀN). If u2(x
2h+2











N is again a shorter improvement cycle in G(ÀN).
We denote B = g(¥), B0 = g(¥1) \ g(¥2), and, for each i 2 N, Bi = g(¥i) n B0 and
Y i = g¡1(Bi) \ ¥. By de¯nition, B1 \ B2 = ;. We de¯ne À¤
i: À¤
i(a) = maxb2B Ài(b) for
a 2 Bi; À¤
i(a) = minb2B Ài(b) for a 2 B3¡i; À¤














N is an improvement cycle in G(À¤
N) as well.
Step 2. For each i 2 N, the set Y i is a singleton (hence Bi is a singleton as well).
Proof. First, we note that Bi 6= ; for each i 2 N by (1). Let g(x
2k+1
N ) 2 B1 3 g(x
2h+1
N )













2 g, we obtain that either g(x
2k+1
1 ;x2h
2 ) 2 B1 or g(x
2h+1
1 ;x2k
2 ) 2 B1.
















2 ) > u¤
1(x2h
N ) because g(x2h











2 ) because g(x
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is an improvement cycle in G(À¤
N) for similar reasons. In either case, we obtain a contra-
diction with the assumption that a shorter improvement cycle is impossible.
Since m > 2, Step 2 immediately implies B0 6= ;. We also see that each À¤
i actually
coincides with Ài. Henceforth, we use the notation Y i = fyi
Ng.
Step 3. There is i 2 N such that y1
i = y2
i.
Proof. Since we can start the cycle anyplace, we assume that y2
N = x0








1 g £ fx0
2;x2k
2 g, we obtain that one of the following four alternatives must hold.
If g(x0
1;x2k







N is an improvement cycle in
G(ÀN). If g(x0
1;x2k



































N is an improvement
cycle.
As in the proof of Step 2, we have a contradiction with the assumption that a shorter
improvement cycle is impossible.
3We are approaching a ¯nal contradiction. Supposing, without restricting generality,
that y1
2 = y2
2, we pick a 2 Argmaxb2B0 À1(b); by de¯nition, there is k 2 K such that
g(x2k
N ) = a. Since u1(x
2k+1
N ) > u1(x2k
N ), we must have x
2k+1
N = y1
N; but then x2k
N = y2
N by
Steps 3 and 1, hence g(x2k
N ) = 2 B0.
4 Extensions
Corollary 1. Let G be a ¯nite two person game form. If no antagonistic derivative game
G(À;¡À) admits an improvement cycle, then G is acyclic.
Proof. Since the necessity in Lemma 1 was proven with a reference to Moulin (1976),
where antagonistic utilities were considered, we obtain that every 2 £ 2 fragment of G is
Nash consistent. Now our Theorem 1 applies.
Corollary 2. Let G be a ¯nite two person game form. If no derivative game G(ÀN)
admits a best response improvement cycle, then G is acyclic.

















2)) = 1 and








2)) = 1 and À2(a) = 0




2)g. Clearly, the fragment becomes a best response improvement
cycle in G(ÀN).
When there are more than two players, the straightforward analogue of Theorem 1
does not hold.
Example. Let us consider a three person 2£2£2 game form with four outcomes, where









Applying Lemma 1, we immediately see that every 2 £ 2 fragment is Nash consistent.
On the other hand, let us consider the following utilities: À1(c) = À1(d) = 2, À1(b) = 1,
À1(a) = 0; À2(b) = À2(c) = 2, À2(a) = 1, À2(d) = 0; À3(a) = À3(d) = 1, À3(b) = À3(c) = 0.









hence there is no Nash equilibrium. Therefore, the game form is not even Nash consistent.
Hypothesis. A ¯nite game form G is acyclic if and only if every fragment of G is Nash
consistent.
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